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“Your brain is no longer your own!”: Mass Media,
Secular Religion, and Cultural Crisis in Third
Republic France
MARK MEYERS
Abstract
This essay examines the historical and discursive process that led various elites
in Third Republic France (1871–1940) to interpret the modern mass media as
vehicles for new, secular forms of religious experience. It argues that this inter-
pretation owed its origins to fin-de-siècle theories about the links between
collective behaviour, hypnotic suggestion, and “religiosity.” It also demon-
strates that this interpretation enjoyed cultural resonance because of the
specific formal properties of new audio-visual media such as radio. Adopting
the methodological framework of cultural history, this paper suggests that the
symbolic relevance of the term “religion” actually expanded during this
period, which is well known for its growing secularism. It thus maintains that
secularization in this context was not a uniform or teleological process, but one
fraught with ambiguity and complexity.
Résumé
Cet article examine le processus historique et discursif qui a mené diverses
élites de la Troisième République française (1871-1940) à considérer les
médias de masse modernes comme véhicules des formes nouvelles et profanes
de l’expérience religieuse. Il fait valoir qu’une telle interprétation tire ses ori-
gines des théories de fin-de-siècle sur les liens entre le comportement collectif,
la suggestion hypnotique et la « religiosité ». Il démontre également qu’une
telle interprétation a joui d’une résonnance culturelle significative en raison
des propriétés formelles spécifiques des nouveaux médias audio-visuels comme
la radio. En adoptant le cadre méthodologique de l’histoire culturelle, l’auteur
suggère que la pertinence symbolique du mot « religion » a pris de l’ampleur
The author wishes to thank Carolyn Dean, Brett Fairbairn, Valerie Korinek, Larry Stewart, and
the anonymous reviewers for the Journal of the Canadian Historical Association for their
helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.
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au cours de cette période mieux connue pour sa laïcité croissante. Par con-
séquent, il soutient que la sécularisation dans un tel contexte ne s’est pas
produite de façon uniforme ou téléologique, mais qu’elle représente plutôt un
processus riche d’ambigüité et de complexité.
In 1939 the social theorist and former surrealist Jules Monnerot invited readersof the literary review Volontés to respond to an inquiry about whether new sec-
ular “spiritual directors” had replaced the religious ones of the past. His list of
possible spiritual guides included political leaders “to whom the masses listen,”
journalists — “especially those working for newspapers with large circulations”
— and publishers, who “grant or refuse the imprimatur, as the spiritual powers
once did.” Monnerot also asked respondents to address whether they saw “in the
large post-war nationalist movements ... a return of the tribal religions” that had
long ago been replaced by “victorious Christianity.” The inquiry implied the
likelihood of an important connection between secular mass phenomena and dis-
placed religious impulses. It also raised the possibility that through modern
rationalism society had “attained a sort of adulthood” that allowed it to dispense
with spiritual direction.1
By the time Monnerot posed these questions, the modern media had dra-
matically transformed cultural, political, and social life in France and elsewhere.
To the nineteenth century world of novels, illustrated magazines, and the press,
the interwar years had added radio, comic books, and “talking” cinema. By the
1930s the evolution of photo-mechanical and printing techniques had also per-
mitted the rapid and inexpensive production of photographic images in
newspapers, such as Paris-Soir, and magazines, such as the popular Vu, which
was akin to the American Life magazine. Indeed, mass-produced images and
spoken words began to influence the public to the point that large-scale cultural
transmission no longer necessarily required literacy as its foundation.2 This fact
alone was a considerable source of anxiety for many French elites. As the new
1 Volontés was a monthly review devoted to the discussion of literature, the arts, and, to a lesser
extent, social and political theory and philosophy. The slogan on its cover claimed it was “for
the defense of values, for the free expression of thought, for poetry,” and “against the com-
mercialization of thought, art, and man.” (All translations by author unless otherwise
indicated.) The inquiry and the responses to it appeared in the February and June 1939 issues
(nos. 14 and 18 respectively). For a portion of the inquiry and selected responses, see Denis
Hollier, ed., Le Collège de Sociologie, 2nd ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 569-76, 762-96.
Translation taken from Denis Hollier, ed., The College of Sociology (1937–39), trans. Betsy
Wing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 51-2.
2 Statistical information confirms the growth of the audio-visual media in France during this
period: the number of movie theatres increased by 75 percent between 1920 and 1929, from
2,400 to 4,200. Between 1930 and 1939, the number of radio receivers jumped more than ten-
fold, from 500,000 to 5.2 million. By 1938 Paris-Soir — the first daily newspaper to make
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media became increasingly important to the propaganda machines of fascist and
communist regimes, it became ever more crucial to assess their real and poten-
tial impact on French society. If the mass media — and the political formations
using them—were vehicles for new forms of religiosity, what did that mean for
the hard-won secularism of the Republic? What did it say about the scientific
worldview that made the invention of media technology possible in the first
place? Had secular science helped create new religions? Was it possible that the
modern world was at once both secular and religious?
This paper reconstructs the historical and discursive process through which
the modern mass media placed the relationship between the religious and the
secular under stress. It argues that this process blurred the boundaries between
these domains, ultimately provoking a crisis in French republicanism, which
had idealized and instituted their separation. Although its focus is on the inter-
war period, it begins with an analysis of a fin-de-siècle medico-scientific
discourse on hypnosis, which, along with a more popular pseudo-scientific dis-
course on crowds and their alleged “religious” nature, shaped most interwar
interpretations of the mass media. These two discourses laid the groundwork
for the notion that the modern media promoted not rational communication, but
mass hypnosis and the development of secular religions. Together, they also
provide an early example of how scientific and religious vocabularies could
intermingle in explanations of collective or “mass” phenomena. As the second
section of this paper demonstrates, a similar blending occurred in assessments
of the modern media’s ability to bring, in audio-visual form, faraway realities
into living-rooms and movie houses. This power to make the absent “present”
resulted from the ingenious exploitation of the physics of light and sound. But
it also invited comparisons between the media and religion or the occult, since
those domains had long held claims on the ability to conjure up in spiritual or
ghostly form realities that were not physically present.
These first two sections thus tell the story of how, when it came to the mod-
ern mass media, the term “religion” expanded its symbolic reach during the
Third Republic (1871–1940), even as France took secularism to new heights
with the positivist-materialist outlook and anti-clerical policies of the republic’s
founders and many of its leaders. I offer a genealogy of the idea that the mod-
ern secular world has, paradoxically, produced new forms of “religious”
extensive use of photography in France — boasted a circulation of two million, nearly one-
third of the total combined circulation for all Paris newspapers and double that of its rival, Le
Petit Parisien. On the history of the interwar French media, see Olivier Barrot and Pascal Ory,
eds., Entre deux guerres: la création française entre 1919–1939 (Paris: François Bourin,
1990); Pascale Goetschel and Emmanuelle Loyer, Histoire culturelle et intellectuelle de la
France au XXe siècle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995); Jean-Noël Jeanneney, Une histoire des
médias des origines à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 1996); Régine Robin,Masses et culture de masse
dans les années 30 (Paris: Ouvrières, 1991); and Claude Bellanger, et al., eds., Histoire
générale de la presse française, vol. III (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972).
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experience, and that secularism can not be adequately described without
recourse to the language of religion. As shall be seen in the final section, many
interwar commentators experienced that paradox as the symptom of a serious
cultural and spiritual crisis, one that was exacerbated by the perception that the
interwar dictatorships — and especially Nazi Germany— offered visions of the
nefarious political forms that secular religions might take.3
The notion that interpretations of mass phenomena typically engage the
category of the “religious” is not new. In an erudite intellectual history of the-
ories of mass culture, Patrick Brantlinger argues, “The social and industrial
processes that have created the modern mass media seem intrinsically bound up
with secularization. But mass culture also can be viewed as a substitute for
mythology or even as an ersatz religion.”4 Brantlinger takes the connection
between secular mass culture and ersatz religiosity at face value and tracks its
expression in the works of prominent Western intellectuals ranging from
Nietzsche and Eliot to Marx and McLuhan. This paper in contrast draws evi-
dence from a range of commentators — some of whom were little-known
outside France — to address how, why, and to what effect that connection was
generated in the more localized context of the Third Republic. In choosing this
focus, my aim is not to argue for a specifically French response to the problem
of mass culture, but to investigate a level of cultural production bypassed in
Brantlinger’s focus on transnational intellectual history. My methodological
inspiration comes from the “new cultural history” — no longer so new —
which distinguished itself by treating the meaning of categories such as
“women” or the “working class” not as self-evident but as the outcome of broad
historical-discursive processes.5 Here, it is the often unquestioned link between
3 I located many of the primary sources cited in this paper by searching the subject catalogues
of the Bibliothèque nationale de France using terms such as “fascism,” “masses,” “media,”
“radio,” “cinema,” etc. I also surveyed publications such as L’Illustration, Psychologie et vie
(a magazine of popular psychology), and the Encyclopédie française. Though the evidence I
gleaned from periodicals is not cited here, it has influenced my thinking in a general sense and
plays a role in the larger study of which this paper is a part. My research revealed that most
commentators on modern mass phenomena relied to some degree on the discursive framework
of nineteenth-century crowd psychology in advancing their interpretations, which does not
mean that they used that framework in the same way, only that its governing terms proved
highly salient for many. More traditional social scientists, such as those in the Durkheimian
school of sociology, paid surprisingly little attention to the modern media and their impact,
tending instead to focus their research on exotic cultures.
4 Patrick Brantlinger, Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 82.
5 Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of
California Press, 1989). See also Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt eds., Beyond the Cultural
Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1999); and William J. Bouwsma, “From History of Ideas to
History of Meaning,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 12, no. 2 (Autumn 1981): 279-91.
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modern mass phenomena and displaced “religious” impulses that finds itself
subjected to this form of analysis. The paper is organized thematically rather
than chronologically in order to highlight continuities between fin-de-siècle and
interwar discourses on modern mass phenomena.
By examining how the mass media disturbed the traditional meaning of
secularity, this paper also uncovers a previously unexplored episode in the his-
tory of secularism in republican France. Historians of the Third Republic have
mostly focused on debates over secularization within and between political par-
ties, the secularization of public education in the 1880s, and the famous law of
1905, which ended Napoleon’s concordat and instituted the separation of
church and state, much to the dismay of the Vatican.6 Shifting the focus away
from politics, society, and law and toward the cultural production of meaning,
this paper demonstrates that the discourse on secularism also suffered a sym-
bolic crisis during this period — one that culminated in interwar assessments
of the modern mass media and their effects. The fact that the meaning of the
“religious” actually expanded during this period of growing secularism
prompts a rethinking of how secularism itself is understood. The evidence from
the French context suggests that this process involved more than the gradual
removal of religion from public life; secular mass phenomena at least (and the
ways they were interpreted) also gave to the term “religion” a measure of
semantic fluidity and ambiguity that it had not previously enjoyed. In other
words, secular culture did not simply marginalize religion. It also transformed
what counted as religious experience.
I. “Hypnotism … takes place in everyday life”
Interwar cultural and political commentators regularly used the relationship
between hypnotists and their subjects as a metaphor for the relationship
between the mass media and the public, or, even more commonly, between the
media-savvy dictator and the masses. Russian expatriate psycho-physiologist
and committed republican Wladimir Drabovitch, for example, remarked that
6 Major studies include Malcolm O. Partin, Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, and the Church: The
Politics of Anticlericalism, 1899–1905 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969); John
McManners, Church and State in France, 1870–1914 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972);
Maurice Larkin, Church and State after the Dreyfus Affair: The Separation Issue in France
(London: Macmillan, 1974); and Pierre Chevallier, La séparation de l’Église et de l’école:
Jules Ferry et Léon XIII (Paris: Fayard, 1981). See also Maurice Larkin, “Religion, anticleri-
calism, and secularization,” chap. in Modern France 1880–2002, ed. James McMillan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 203-27; and William Safran, “Religion and Laïcité
in a Jacobin Republic: The Case of France,” chap. in The Secular and the Sacred: Nation,
Religion and Politics, ed. William Safran (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 54-81. Cultural histo-
rians have only recently begun to examine this topic. For example, see Caroline Ford, Divided
Houses: Religion and Gender in Modern France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
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“the modern dictator” controlled a series of modern “weapons … the press, the
radio, the cinema, aviation,” representing what he called “the means of collec-
tive hypnosis.”7 For his part, the physician and novelist Georges Duhamel — a
well-known cultural commentator — wrote of movie-goers anticipating the
beginning of a film: “They wait, their eyes troubled, already ready for the hyp-
nosis that will soon seize them, in the enchanted shadows.”8 Finally, the
little-known writer Marino-Bertil Issautier, in the context of interpreting the
sway of political parties in terms of collective suggestion, wrote, “hypnotic
sleep only makes evident — through exaggeration — [the suggestibility] inher-
ent in the human mind. What happens in hypnotism,” he continued, “also takes
place in everyday life, albeit under other guises.”9 What was at stake in pre-
senting hypnosis as the key to understanding how the mass media and mass
politics functioned? And how were references to hypnosis linked to the process
through which modern mass phenomena came to be viewed as sites where the
secular domain converged with the realm of the religious or occult?
The history of hypnosis is complex and multifaceted, and it is not my aim
to discuss it in a comprehensive way.10 It bears emphasizing that during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, members of the scientific and medical estab-
lishment for the first time began to take a serious interest in hypnosis. They
gradually proffered a scientific, physiological, materialist explanation for the
phenomenon that replaced earlier superstitious or “unscientific” ones. The most
important scientific paradigm of hypnosis emerged in the 1880s out of the
research of Dr. Hippolyte Bernheim, a respected physician and professor of
medicine at the University of Nancy in France. In contrast to rival researchers
such as the noted neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot, Bernheim argued that the
brain’s physiology possessed inherent properties that rendered all people vul-
nerable to hypnotic suggestion. His clinical experiments focused mainly on
male subjects, partly in order to dispel the notion that those susceptible to hyp-
notic suggestion were “all weak-nerved, weak-brained, hysterical, or women.”11
Bernheim also contended that previously hypnotized subjects were especially
responsive to suggestion in the waking state. Thus, according to his theory, not
7 Wladimir Drabovitch, Fragilité de la liberté et séduction des dictatures: Essai de psychologie
sociale, with a preface by Pierre Janet (Paris: Mercure de France, 1934), 158-9.
8 Georges Duhamel, Scènes de la vie future (Paris: Mercure de France, 1931), 48.
9 M.-B. Issautier, Les Grandes suggestions de l’histoire (Paris: Sorlot, 1940), 49-50.
10 Histories of hypnotism include Adam Crabtree, From Mesmer to Freud: Magnetic Sleep and
the Roots of Psychological Healing (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Alan
Gauld, A History of Hypnotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Gerrit L.
Verschuur, Hidden Attraction: the Mystery and History of Magnetism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993). See also Léon Chertok and Isabelle Stengers, A Critique of
Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis as a Scientific Problem from Lavoisier to Lacan, trans.
Martha Noel Evans (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), especially Chapter 1.
11 Quoted in Gauld, History of Hypnotism, 325-6.
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only were all people vulnerable to suggestion, they could all potentially be
manipulated to accept suggested ideas while fully conscious.
Bernheim contributed to a larger process that wrested hypnosis, or “animal
magnetism” (as it had been previously called), from the various occult or
pseudo-scientific discourses that had shaped its meaning, such as Allan
Kardec’s spiritist movement, which had been popular during the Second
Empire.12 The physician and physiology professor Charles Richet — writing in
1922 about an 1875 article in which he had advocated an experimental and sci-
entific approach to hypnosis — claimed that his article had helped inaugurate
the period in which “animal magnetism ceased to be an occult science.” In that
article Richet had argued that hypnosis was a “phenomenon of normal physiol-
ogy” and that there was no need to “imagine any magical or magnetic action.”13
Fin-de-siècle research on hypnosis challenged not only occult but also tra-
ditional religious definitions of the otherworldly domain. This challenge is
evident in the writings of Catholics who opposed scientists’ efforts to under-
stand what they termed “supernatural phenomena” in terms of physiology and
materialism. Pie-Michel Rolfi, an Italian priest whose book on hypnotism was
translated into French in 1902, argued that scientific work on hypnotism only
confirmed what the Church had maintained for centuries in theological teach-
ings on spirits and possession: that such supernatural phenomena were real. A
medico-scientific approach to hypnotism, he believed, mistakenly tried to
understand it “in the framework of those physical, chemical or physiological
phenomena which constitute material nature and to explain it in the same way
and according to the same laws.”14 Rolfi castigated scientists for searching out
materialist explanations for what he considered spiritual phenomena with reli-
gious origins and theological explanations:
I will not allow that the materialists — the scientists — take possession of
cases of this genre; or that they aspire to assimilate them as phenomena of
physics or chemistry; or that they try to connect them to the laws that govern
12 Allan Kardec was a pseudonym for Hippolyte-Léon-Denizard Rivail. For a description of his
movement and its own scientific pretenses, see Thomas A. Kselman, Death and the Afterlife
in Modern France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 143-62.
13 Charles Richet, Thirty Years of Psychical Research: Being a Treatise on Metapsychics, trans.
Stanley De Brath (NewYork: Macmillan, 1923), 32; originally published as Traité de métapsy-
chique (Paris: Alcan, 1922). A corresponding member of the English “Society for Psychical
Research,” Richet was part of an international group of scholars seeking to understand hyp-
nosis and other “metapsychic” phenomena in scientific terms, thus avoiding what he called
“religious or mystical speculation” (31). See Janet Oppenheim, The Other World: Spiritualism
and Psychical Research in England, 1850–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985).
14 Le R. P. Pie-Michel Rolfi, La Magie moderne ou l’hypnotisme de nos jours, trans. H.
Dorangeon from the 3rd. Italian ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1902), 3. The first edition was published in
Italy in 1899.
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the material world whether organic or inorganic; or that they speak to us of
cathode rays, of Hertzian waves, of cerebral vibrations; or, finally, that con-
found classes of phenomena which must remain absolutely distinct and
separate.15
Rolfi’s text made clear that the scientific colonization of the supernatural
had not gone unnoticed or unchallenged by the traditional custodians of that
domain. Moreover, his reference to “cathode rays” (streams of electrons which
can be manipulated to project images onto a fluorescent screen) and “Hertzian
waves” (low-frequency electromagnetic or “radio” waves) indicated that the
materialist interpretation of hypnosis was not the only scientific development
thought to be intruding upon the religious or spiritual realm: indeed, at least two
discoveries important to the technological history of the modern audio-visual
media — cathode rays and radio waves — posed similar threats.16 The research
that posited the physiological basis of hypnosis was just one exponent of a
broader historical process through which the materialist discourse of science
stretched its interpretive reach to explain phenomena that had been understood
by men such as Rolfi to be immaterial, spiritual, and religious in nature.
By the 1890s Bernheim’s theory of hypnosis had become dominant both in
France and abroad. It left an indelible mark on studies of collective and crowd
psychology, which themselves were in their heyday during the same decade. In
his influential 1895 book Psychologie des foules, Gustave Le Bon made an
explicit connection between hypnosis and the production of collective values,
whether those values were expressed in actual or “psychological” crowds, by
which he meant groups of people whose members were not in physical prox-
imity to one another:
[A]n individual immersed for some length of time in a crowd...soon finds him-
self...in a special state which much resembles the state of fascination in which
the hypnotised individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser. The
activity of the brain being paralysed in the case of the hypnotised subject, the
latter becomes the slave of all the unconscious activities of his spinal cord,
which the hypnotiser directs at will .... Such also is approximately the state of
the individual forming part of a psychological crowd.17
15 Ibid., 4.
16 On these and other discoveries important to twentieth-century technologies, see Vaclav Smil,
Creating the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations of 1867–1914 and their Lasting Impact
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
17 Gustave Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 4th Quadridge ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1991), 13-14; The Crowd, intro. Robert A. Nye (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction,
1995), 51, translation modified. On the history of French crowd psychology, see Robert A.
Nye, The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy
in the Third Republic (London: Sage Publications, 1975); Susanna Barrows, Distorting
Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France (New Haven, CT: Yale
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Similarly, the noted collective psychologist and criminologist Gabriel Tarde
explicitly used hypnosis as a way to theorize the relationship between the psy-
chological and the social: “Hypnotism is the experimental juncture of
psychology and sociology; it shows us the most simplified sort of psychic life
which can be conceived of under the form of the most elementary social rela-
tion.”18 In a stunning passage in his 1890 Les Lois de l’imitation, Tarde
claimed, “The social, like the hypnotic state, is only a form of a dream…. Both
the somnambulist and the social man are possessed by the illusion that their
ideas, all of which have been suggested to them, are spontaneous.”19 The logic
of hypnotic suggestion was thus not opposed to the logic of normal social rela-
tions but rather helped account for those relations.
Although the scientific model of hypnosis was overturning religious and
occult categories, early collective and crowd psychologists’ use of that same
model to theorize the logic of collective phenomena ultimately helped to refig-
ure and expand the meaning of the religious. Le Bon had understood the
category of the crowd very broadly — even using it to make sense of the
dynamics of parliaments and juries — and he consistently associated it with
religiosity. “The crowd,” he wrote, “demands a god before anything else,”
adding elsewhere that “a person is not religious solely when he worships a
divinity, but when he puts all the resources of his mind, the complete submis-
sion of his will, and the whole-souled ardour of fanaticism at the service of a
cause or an individual who becomes the goal and guide of his thoughts and
actions.”20 He even implied that atheism, if expressed by a collectivity or
group, could itself become a religion of sorts: “Were it possible to induce the
masses to adopt atheism, this belief would exhibit all the intolerant ardour of a
religious sentiment.” The same was true for positivism, which Le Bon called an
atheistic “religion.”21 Le Bon’s logic thus cast the “religious sentiment” as uni-
versal, trans-historical and virtually co-extensive with any configuration of
collective values whether espoused by crowds, “the masses,” or even positivist
social scientists. And since hypnosis rather than reason was the force through
University Press, 1981); and Serge Moscovici, The Age of The Crowd: A Historical Treatise
on Mass Psychology, trans. J.C. Whitehouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985;
Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1985). Le Bon’s book enjoyed a large and politically
diverse audience between the wars. It reached its 41st edition by 1939 and thus became “one
of the best-selling scientific books in history.” Nye, Origins of Crowd Psychology, 3. On Le
Bon’s popularity and influence, see also Moscovici, Age of the Crowd, 49, 54-8.
18 Gabriel Tarde, Penal Philosophy, trans. Rapelje Howell (Boston: Little, Brown, 1912), 193,
quoted in Barrows, Distorting Mirrors, 124. Tarde’s statement originally appeared in “Qu’est-
ce qu’une société?” Revue Philosophique 18 (1884): 489-510.
19 Gabriel Tarde, Les Lois de l’imitation (Paris: Alcan, 1890), 77, 87, quoted in Barrows,
Distorting Mirrors, 139.
20 Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 41, 39-40; The Crowd, 96, 94.
21 Ibid., 41; 97.
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which those values were created and communicated, it was at once universal-
ized and linked symbolically to the encroachment of the religious onto secular
terrain.
Hypnosis, as Bernheim had theorized it, supplied crowd psychology with
a paradigm for the communication process that dispensed with the category of
rationality — or, rather, displaced it. If there was anything rational about com-
munication, it was no longer located in the reasoning individual but in the
workings of brain physiology. Reason, in short, was not centred in the mind, but
in the body.22 Once it was modeled on hypnosis, interpersonal communication
appeared to be founded on categories that were opposed to reason: faith, belief,
dreams, i.e., the stuff of religion and the occult. Moreover, even if collective
consciousness was governed by physiology — its mechanism scientifically
explainable — its manifestations were religious in character. When it came to
explaining the “epidemic” of fervent support for military-general-turned-pop-
ulist-politician Georges Boulanger in the late 1880s, Bernheim said it was “due
to suggestion” (which, again, he understood as a physiological phenomenon).23
Le Bon claimed that Boulangism demonstrated that religious feelings were not
the “superstitions of a bygone age which reason has definitely banished.”24
Both men framed their arguments as scientific, physiological, and materialist
explanations for what they saw as the heightened proclivity of social groups to
incubate and be led by religious or quasi-religious sentiments. Their thinking
formed a crucial part of the process through which the term “religion”
expanded beyond its traditional meaning as a coordinated and collectively-held
set of beliefs in the reality and meaningfulness of a supernatural order. At the
heart of that process of semantic expansion was a collapse of the normal and
the pathological: hypnotic suggestion was now at the centre of normal social
interaction, while groups in general were prone to the same religious fervour as
mobs. Once religion was defined in this expanded way, it could be interpreted
as literally present in any affectively-charged collective formation or experi-
ence.
This line of reasoning was both reductive and extreme. It allowed Le Bon
to articulate a conservative critique of democratic reforms such as universal
male suffrage, which he believed were eroding individual autonomy and sacri-
ficing political rule to “the crowd.” Later, though, the metonymic chain he
created between hypnosis, the crowd, the collective, and the religious shaped
22 Le Bon, for example, subscribed to an evolutionary-biological paradigm that framed the rea-
soning process as “unconscious and involuntary.” Nye, Origins of Crowd Psychology, 25.
Reason, for Le Bon, was first and foremost a phenomenon of brain physiology. Nye, Origins
of Crowd Psychology, 24-8.
23 Cited in André Pressat, “L’Hypnotisme et la presse,” Revue de l’hypnotisme 4 (1889–1890):
230, quoted in Barrows, Distorting Mirrors, 124.
24 Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 41; The Crowd, 96.
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republican interpretations of mass culture and politics as homogenizing forces
that gave expression to submerged religious longings. Remarks like the fol-
lowing from Wladimir Drabovitch, a member of the republican Ligue des
Droits de l’Homme, were typical:
Even in countries which have remained free, opinion is becoming more and
more crowd-like. The modern world, thanks to the diffusion of the press, to
the radio, to aviation, and to a greater population density — has become a
huge crowd. Emotions, fears, hopes, beliefs, and suspicions spread themselves
out, reverberate, and strengthen themselves immensely by contagion and sug-
gestion.25
The commentator Lucien Romier, a political editor at Le Figaro until 1927 and
an historian by training, devoted a chapter of his book L’Homme nouveau to the
“mechanical action” that new communication technology was exercising on
“the thought of crowds” — the term “crowd” referring here to the general pub-
lic.26 Arguably, the link between crowds and audio-visual media also found
inspiration in Le Bon’s view that the crowd “thinks in images” and was partic-
ularly susceptible to the influence of the spoken word.27
II. “Mystics and sorcerers …”
New media technologies marked yet another episode in the process through
which the rational worldview of modern science replaced the outmoded cos-
mology of religion. Certainly, they reinforced public confidence in scientists’
ability to know and manipulate the material world, whether visible or invisible.
The early radio historian Arno Huth wrote in 1937 that the radio “is less an
‘invention’ properly speaking, than an ingenious exploitation of the phenomena
of nature, a direct and synthetic consequence of scientific and technical
research.”28 Charles Richet suggested in 1922 that telephone technology had
made it possible to state what would have been “absurdly inadmissible” before
1875, except in an occult or religious context: that is, “that the voice of an indi-
vidual speaking in Paris can be heard in Rome.” Anyone making this statement
in 1875, he claimed, “would have been thought a dangerous lunatic.”29 Richet
made this point and others in the context of advocating scientific rather than
religious/occult explanations for what he called “metapsychic” phenomena —
from mental telepathy to levitation. In the case of telephony, his argument was
25 Drabovitch, Fragilité de la liberté, 148.
26 Lucien Romier, L’Homme nouveau: esquisse des conséquences du progrès (Paris: Hachette,
1929), 180-201.
27 Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 20; The Crowd, 61.
28 Arno Huth, La Radiodiffusion: puissance mondiale (Paris: Gallimard, 1937), 21.
29 Richet, Thirty Years, 9.
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simply that what had seemed impossible to state rationally 50 years ago even-
tually became possible through science. His point was that phenomena such as
levitation might also be scientifically explainable. “Metapsychic phenomena,”
he wrote, “should be treated as problems of pure physiology.”30
For all their advocacy of science and reason, figures such as Richet unwit-
tingly participated in a larger historical process whereby the modern media —
from telephony to film — were culturally constructed as sites where the reli-
gious and the secular converged. Instead of eliminating religious or occult
categories, new media reconfigured and displaced them, with the technology
making it possible to imagine the experience of everyday secular life as imbued
with a supernatural aspect. Even though Richet meant his remark about tele-
phonic communication to demonstrate the ascendancy of science, he also made
explicit the potential for the new medium to be compared to religious or occult
phenomena. Telephony, after all, transforms the speaking person into a disem-
bodied voice — into a “phantom reality,” so to speak, that enters the receiver’s
experience as a phenomenological rather than as an ontological reality. It cre-
ates the experience, in real time, of a “presence” that is nonetheless absent.
Even if everyone knew that modern telephony was a scientific achievement, the
fact that it performed this particular function meant that it could evoke religion
or the occult at a figurative level. The fact that Richet brought up telephony in
a book intended to refute the occult did not necessarily eliminate the symbolic
association between the two.
Analogies between the effects of the new media and religious or occult
phenomena were common among cultural commentators during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Even electricity, which made modern
media technologies possible (with the exception of photography) figured as the
“vehicle of diabolical action” or “the mask of the demon” in the imaginations
of some Catholics during the Second Empire.31 By the interwar period, it was
radio that elicited comparisons with occult phenomena. In the context of dis-
cussing a 1928 doctoral thesis on the occult sources of romanticism, Gustave
Cohen, a professor of French history and literature, posed a rhetorical question
to radio listeners: “Are not all of you mystics [illuminés] and sorcerers, you
who, with the slight turn of a button, arouse the distant waves?”32 Such analo-
30 Ibid., 45. For a discussion of how “psychic research” was connected to a fascination with com-
munication technologies, see Pamela Thurschwell, Literature, Technology and Magical
Thinking, 1880–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
31 See Le R. P. Xavier Pailloux, Le Magnétisme, le spiritisme et la possession: Entretiens sur les
esprits entre un théologien, un avocat, un philosophe et un médecin (Paris: Jacques Lecoffre,
1863), 280-1.
32 Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques Doucet, Paris, France, Fonds Michel Leiris, MS. B-95,
“Occultisme: Textes et notes. A la suite, coupures de presse,” newsclip no. 4. This clipping is
headlined “Les sources occultes du romantisme,” by Gustave Cohen.
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gies supplied a way of making sense of the new, wondrous, and remarkably var-
ied technologies of representation from photography, telephony, and
phonographs in the nineteenth century, to radio, film, and electromagnetic
sound recordings in the twentieth. They circulated despite the fact that science
could obviously explain how such technologies functioned.
There was indeed something magical or occult-like in radio’s ability to sep-
arate the physical reality of the speaking or singing body, or of the musical
instrument, from the simultaneous experience of those realities in multiple loca-
tions. That capacity to confound reality and representation — and to challenge
traditional notions of experience — was not lost on the new medium’s first pro-
moters. In an early demonstration that took place at the TrocadéroAmphitheater,
the commercial director of France’s first private station, Radiola, placed a flute
player in a soundproof glass dome along with a microphone wired to the sta-
tion’s studio on the boulevard Haussmann. When the flutist began to play, none
of the 5,000 people in the theater could hear anything because of the dome. Next
to the dome, however, was a radio equipped with a powerful amplifier and sev-
eral speakers. Only when it was turned on could the spectators in the room hear
the music. In order to further dramatize the event, the station had spread other
speakers throughout the city so that those who could not fit in the theater could
listen to the demonstration.33 In this way radio producers literalized the formal
principle of their medium’s operation (the sound of the flute being literally both
present and absent) and highlighted the novel relationships it established
between senders and receivers, between listeners and events. It is perhaps no
accident that the demonstration took place at a major French radio festival in
1923. Such an occasion furnished an ideal opportunity for radio to indulge in
that precious capacity for self-reflexivity that often marks the early history of an
invention, but which inevitably fades as the invention exchanges its novelty sta-
tus for a place in the ordinary world of the taken-for-granted.34
Radio technology in particular may have lent itself to associations with
religious phenomena because of the long-standing connection between orality
and the sacred in bothWestern and non-Western religious traditions. As the the-
ologian and cultural theorist Walter Ong pointed out, “the interiorizing force of
the oral word relates in a special way to the sacral, to the ultimate concerns of
existence. In most religions the spoken word functions integrally in ceremonial
and devotional life.”35 Considering Le Bon’s construction of social groups as
33 This event is recounted (but not interpreted) in René Duval, “Radio-Paris,” chap. in Entre deux
guerres, 136.
34 On this general idea, see Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking About
Electric Communication in the Late Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988).
35 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen,
1982), 74.
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essentially “religious” in character alongside his emphasis on such groups’ vul-
nerability to orally-conveyed suggestions, it seems safe to infer that a subtle
connection between religiosity and orality was operative in his paradigm, and
that this connection played at least some role in shaping the discursive context
in which interwar thinking on radio and radio audiences emerged, and through
which the relationship between mass culture and religiosity would be articu-
lated.
Many of the above themes came together in Marino-Bertil Issautier’s lit-
tle-known book Les grandes suggestions de l’histoire, published in 1940.
Issautier had a strong interest in occult phenomena and later directed the review
Esprit et matière, which appears to have had links to an esoteric religious
group.36 His book is of interest not only for the way it relied on Le Bon’s frame-
work to comprehend cultural phenomena from advertising to Nazism. It also
yoked the spiritual or the sacred to modern technology even as it displayed a
keen sense of the scientific — that is, secular and rationalist — discoveries that
had made such technology possible.37
Fascinated by electricity and electromagnetic phenomena, Issautier argued
that the work of modern physicists left no doubt “that electricity is the founda-
tion of life itself.”38 Radio technology — which converted sounds into
electrical impulses and transmitted them through the air at various wave fre-
quencies — had demonstrated, for Issautier, “that sound and speech (and even
images) can easily travel through space by means of simple electric waves,”
waves that he also described alternatively as “spiritual” or “suggestive.”39 He
believed that while radio had “augmented and facilitated invisible communica-
tion through interceptible waves,” such invisible communication was not new
in and of itself. In certain periods of history, he argued, “this primitive and mis-
recognized force of human nature — manifested sporadically in phenomena
like telepathy— took precedence over other, so-called artificial, modes of com-
munication.”40 Electromagnetic waves, he added, might well explain a variety
of natural and social phenomena “that exert their actions from a distance and
whose mechanism is immaterial and invisible.”41 He added that history was
36 The group was the “Grande Fraternité Blanche Universelle,” founded at the turn of the century
by a Bulgarian mystic. The term “blanche” was not a racial designation but referred to those
who promote the world’s spiritual advancement.
37 In a clear appropriation of Le Bon’s framework, Issautier wrote that the characteristics of reli-
gious sentiment “find themselves, more or less adulterated, in the emotions and passions of
crowds,” Grandes suggestions, 91. Moreover, like Le Bon, Issautier claimed that “crowds”
and “masses” were more similar than they were different in terms of their corrosive effect on
individual autonomy.
38 Issautier, Grandes suggestions, 35.
39 Ibid., 35, 13, 15.
40 Ibid., 120.
41 Ibid., 35-6.
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explainable through reference to various “currents of waves” whose character-
istics could be spiritual, moral, positive, negative, physical, or psychical. “Men
make history,” he wrote, “but the instruments which they employ are above all
spiritual …. More than our Kings, it has been waves which have built our coun-
try, erected its cathedrals, spread our legends through the forests and our songs
through the air of France.”42 Later he added that “suggestions” were generated
“by invisible rays or vibrations, not material but spiritual, which pass through
man and orient personalities in the way they do crowds.”43 For Issautier the
new technology exploited forces that had always anchored the process of cul-
tural transmission, but had not been explained in scientific terms.
What distinguished Issautier’s text was not so much its reliance on the con-
cept of “spirit” to explain culture and society — that concept had a long history
in religious thought and in idealist strains of Western philosophy and psychol-
ogy— but rather that electromagnetic waves now gave the spiritual its meaning
and foundation. “Spirit” in this context did not refer to a transcendental, meta-
physical entity such as God or Mind, but rather to electrical phenomena active
in both material nature and the human body. Issautier pointed to the invention
of the electroencephalograph as proof that the activity of the brain was electri-
cal in nature. He speculated that human thought itself could be reduced to a
calculus of electromagnetic oscillations. This device, which monitored and
recorded the electrical impulses in the brain, had been touted, according to
Issautier, as a “machine for recording thoughts” and as a “detector of cerebral
waves.”44 “The press,” he wrote, “announced that it would reveal lies as well
as the secret thoughts of individuals...that it would diagnose all of the mental
illnesses.”45
At this point Issautier concocted a series of fantasies about such technology,
which, though far-fetched, offer insight into how at least one interwar commen-
tator imagined the impact (or potential) of new media. He called attention to the
Italian scientist Cazamalli’s experiments with “thought photography.” These
experiments used a mechanism similar to the cathode ray tube of the television
to record cerebral electromagnetic discharge. The idea was to create and cata-
logue visual representations of various thoughts (and thus, on some level, to
reduce the importance of written language). Issautier imagined that the Italian
thinker’s work would lead to a kind of photographic dictionary of the principal
brain reactions:
Anything is imaginable! Judges will no longer interrogate the accused; they
will place them under a revelatory antenna. The jealous wife, upon seeing her
42 Ibid., 14.
43 Ibid., 16.
44 Ibid., 37.
45 Ibid.
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husband thinking contemplatively, will no longer inquire: ‘What are you
thinking about?’ She will simply lead him, without his knowledge, beneath an
antenna carefully hidden in a chandelier; then, upon developing the film of his
thoughts, she will consult the chapter entitled ‘infidelity’ in her photographic
dictionary.46
The conclusion, wrote Issautier, was that “your brain is no longer your own!”47
What is important here is the notion that the electromagnetic basis of
thought, reason, and consciousness meant that these could be harnessed and
controlled by technology, and particularly by new technologies of representa-
tion. This possibility added another dimension to the fear that the autonomous
subject of liberal humanism was vanishing under the weight of modern tech-
nology. Shorn of its religious and metaphysical connotations, “the spiritual”
now not only fell under the purview of physics and brain physiology, it became
subject to technological manipulation in a way that was previously unimagin-
able. This possibility was precisely what had motivated Issautier’s study:
The spectacle of our twentieth century pummeled by profound social, politi-
cal and economic upheavals, by civil wars and revolutions, has left nations
forgetful and scatterbrained. We watch them deliver themselves drunkenly to
the whims of fashion, sports and speed, nourish themselves on empty dreams,
cultivate utopia with a passion, but act as somnambulists in the ignorance of
these ‘universal suggestive waves’ which, better understood, would enlighten
us about both our past and present errors. The radio has already revealed
tremendous prospects. Other secrets are anticipated. Our study is an effort to
understand the latent intellectual and moral forces that explain certain collec-
tive currents and phenomena throughout history.48
Both Tarde and Issautier also evoked modern technology and the spiritual
in their respective descriptions of how human thought operates, suggesting con-
tinuity on this issue between the fin-de-siècle and the interwar years. In
particular they used visual media as metaphors for the relationship between
consciousness and society. Tarde defined his most fundamental social-psycho-
logical category — imitation — as “an action of one mind [esprit] over another
from a distance, which consists of the quasi-photographic reproduction of a
cerebral image [cliché cérébral] by the sensitive plate of another brain ...
whether it is desired or not, whether passive or active.”49 Tarde’s choice of pho-
tography as a metaphor for the process through which meaning is disseminated
46 Ibid., 45.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 15.
49 Gabriel Tarde, Les Lois de l’imitation: étude sociologique, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1895; reprint, Paris:
Slatkine Reprints, 1979), viii.
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— and the reference to that process as “inter-spiritual” — is evidence of the
way in which French social theorists began to conceptualize the meaning of the
spiritual in terms of media technology. Issautier, for his part, wrote that “the
unconscious closely resembles cinematographic film …. It records sponta-
neously and incessantly all the impressions, all the waves, all the images, all the
notions which present themselves.”50 Media technologies, in short, became
metaphors for the very process of cultural production and transmission. Linked
both to hypnosis and to religious/occult phenomena, the media could be thus
conceived as at once products of science and as engines of religiosity in the
social world.
From one point of view the media were the fruits of a relentless scientific
effort to understand and manipulate light, sound, electro-magnetic waves, and so
on, and to empty those forces of whatever associations they might have enjoyed
with the supernatural, the religious, or the occult. At the same time, however, the
media could be linked figuratively to religion and the occult because of their
logic of presence and absence, as well as their alleged ability to collectivize con-
sciousness. What emerged from this curious syncretism of scientific and
religious/occult categories was a paradoxical conception of mass media culture
as at once the product of a secular and scientific worldview and as a force
through which that worldview generates its opposite. Secularism, in this dis-
course at least, was thus not opposed to the “religious,” but responsible for its
literal and figurative proliferation. This circumstance suggests that seculariza-
tion has not always been a uniform or teleological process, but rather has been
fraught with ambiguity, complexity, and the efflorescence of new forms of social
experience that secular discourse itself would qualify as “religious.”
III. “… and the State will be God.”
The argument that fascism and communism were secular religions was not a
difficult one for interwar commentators to make, partly because fin-de-siècle
collective and crowd psychologists had already framed modern mass political
movements, such as Boulangism, as displacements of religious instincts. The
great leaders of crowds, wrote Le Bon, held power because they enkindled
“faith — whether religious, political or social.”51 Modern leaders, he wrote,
“no longer have altars, but they have statues, or their portraits are in the hands
of their admirers.”52 For his part Tarde developed a theory of the spiritual
aspects of power in Les Transformations du pouvoir. In that study he argued
that the most powerful political figures do not “emerge from a ballot box —
from a real election — but rather from an imaginary and mystical election. To
50 Issautier, Grandes suggestions, 55-6.
51 Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 70; The Crowd, 141.
52 Ibid., 41; 96.
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all the positive forms of the election, in fact, it is necessary to add and super-
impose its sacred forms.”53
Unlike the communists, who saw their movement as the embodiment of a
scientific and rational worldview, interwar fascists often described their move-
ments using religious language.54 It was not surprising that interwar elites
viewed fascism as the worst-case scenario of what the complete embrace of
secular religion could mean in the sphere of politics. A 1935 pamphlet pub-
lished by a group of republican and left-leaning intellectuals characterized
fascist nationalism as “official nationalism, codified in law, and invested with
a sacrosanct dignity.”55 Novelist and political commentator Henri Pollès wrote
in 1937 of fascism as “a type of religion or imitation of religion,” adding else-
where that “the occult element is the same in false religions and false political
programs.” In arguing that fascism is “opposed to true, rational theology, but
uses all the smoke of religion,” Pollès, who supported the Popular Front, called
attention to the irony of official fascism’s anti-religious ideology.56
For his part Issautier believed that a “certain vague religiosity” existed in
the “collective soul” apart from formal religion. This religiosity could be eas-
ily channeled toward “popular heroes, social idols, social myths or race.”
Germans, he wrote, “convinced of the physiological and psychological superi-
ority of their race,” have made of race “the figure of an idol.” He believed that
modern objects of “spiritual idolatry” had taken on new and extraordinary
forms:
Today we make social forces divine in the way we used to make the forces of
nature divine. We could look at this divinisation of abstract ideas as a vague
rebirth of paganism, but this new religion involves neither altars nor well-
defined rites: speeches take the place of prayers, and the canticles are replaced
by melodies of a different sort — patriotic hymns, revolutionary songs.57
The widely-read Catholic commentator Georges Bernanos combined vari-
ous tropes of collective psychology in his analysis of the “Pagan State,” which
he defined as a secular regime that paradoxically made a religion of the state.
53 Tarde, Les Transformations du pouvoir (Paris: Alcan, 1899), 45.
54 For example, the future collaborator Alphonse de Châteaubriant referred to Nazism as a
“Germanic cathedral” set up in the “interior of souls,” and to Hitler as “an edifier of minds …
who has addressed himself to the profound forces of love and faith.” See his La Gerbe des
forces: nouvelle Allemagne, 7th ed. (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1937), 345-6.
55 Comité de vigilance des intellectuels anti-fascistes, Qu’est-ce que le fascisme? Le fascisme et
la France (Paris, 1935), 13. This group emerged in early March 1934 as a response to right-
wing riots that broke out in Paris on 6 February 1934. The pamphlet lists thirty members,
mainly professors in various disciplines, but also including writers and lycée instructors.
56 Henri Pollès, L’Opéra politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1937), 156, 145n1, 14.
57 Issautier, Grandes suggestions, 92-4.
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The “Pagan State,” he argued, could be fascist, communist, or democratic; its
creation depended less on ideology than it did on the abdication of individual-
ity in favor of the collective. In turn he associated this reality with the loss of
heroism and the triumph of mediocrity. In his war-time Plea For Liberty, he
warned:
an ever-growing number of men refuse the heroic part in life …. [T]hey try
hard to lose themselves in the herd. The moment men have made up their
minds thus to share their mediocrity, the Pagan State is conceived …. When
they reach a certain level of perfection in mediocrity, in uniformity, in the dis-
cipline of the herd, they will have lost their dignity as men, and the State will
be God.58
He linked massification and collectivization, as well as the loss of male dignity,
to the production of secular religions, whatever they might be called.
For Bernanos the “free man” of liberal individualism was threatened not
only by the “deification of fuehrers” in secular religions such as communism
and fascism, but also by liberal regimes that ignored the importance of tradi-
tional religion. Though Bernanos was a republican who opposed clerical
domination, he believed that the well-being of a free society depended on tra-
ditional religious beliefs: “We expect of the Church what God Himself expects:
that she shape men truly free, a breed of free men peculiarly effective because
freedom is for them not only a right, but an obligation, a duty, for which they
must render God an accounting.” A democratic “Pagan State” was thus in some
sense just as pernicious as a totalitarian one. Through this formulation,
Bernanos synthesized Christianity with liberal freedom and offered a way to
conceptualize threats to freedom in terms of the displacement of traditional reli-
gious impulses onto the secular realm of politics. “The free man has but one
enemy, the Pagan State, by whatever name it may be called, and be it embod-
ied in the person of a tyrant or hidden deep in the thick of the sensual and
cowardly mob.”59 In other words, the way to escape the danger of secular reli-
gion lay in reconciling republicanism with traditional revealed religion — a
project that French Christian democrats had called for since the turn of the cen-
tury and that later found expression in the Mouvement Républicain Populaire,
the Christian democratic party founded in 1944 that ruled in a “tripartite” coali-
tion with the communists and socialists after the war.
Ample evidence confirms that interwar elites also viewed the success of
fascism as intimately connected to the emergence of the mass media, and that
they thought the mass media, in turn, were the tools through which fascism cre-
58 Georges Bernanos, Plea for Liberty: Letters to the English, the Americans, the Europeans,
trans. Harry Lorin Binsse (New York: Pantheon, 1944), 242-3.
59 Ibid., 240, 270, 263.
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ated itself as a secular religion. Drabovitch wrote of “the radio speeches of the
dictators … which an entire people is obligated to listen to in religious
silence.”60 However its economic, political, and social aspects were conceptu-
alized, fascism consistently figured as the spectre of a society whose media
were monopolized by the state in the service of homogenizing the population,
robbing individuals of their autonomy, and making its authority sacred. The
media were considered agents that eroded the boundaries between individual
and society, public and private, secular and religious.
Some commentators thought that the formal properties of fascist political
technique were identical to the formal properties of the mass media. Pollès, for
instance, wrote, “Fascism’s daily history unfolds like a serialized novel; is not
the newspaper the essential form of fascism?” Later he confirmed that the for-
mal aspects of fascism were not similar to those of just any newspaper, but
to those of the visually-oriented Paris-Soir — a newspaper that many elites
construed as more of a spectacle than a news source. “A newspaper like Paris-
Soir,” continued Pollès, “having a sports director as its head, could very well ...
form the core of a fascist movement, and recruit ranks for it.” As if to further
reinforce the analogy between fascism and the mass (visual) media, Pollès con-
tended that fascism “is a politics of projectors: the projector displaces attention
from one fragment [parcelle] of a problem onto another fragment; one silences
oneself, one repairs nothing, one makes no progress: it is cinema.”61
Drabovitch argued that modern technology, and particularly media technol-
ogy, could assault individual liberty rather than increase it. In the hands of Nazis
or Soviets, modern technology was not a sign of human progress but rather a
form of instrumental rationality whose overall effect was irrational — to the
point of being comparable to the rule of a despotic theocracy. “Technology,” he
wrote, “can be used to produce the unlimited servitude of the individual, as well
as forms of physical and spiritual oppression more profound than any of the ori-
ental theocracies.” A behind-the-scenes rationality, in other words, underpinned,
for Drabovitch, the production of fascism and communism as religions. This
reality both dislocated the meaning of rationality, science, and technology as
ultimately progressive forces and challenged definitions of “the religious” as
either other-worldly or rooted in nature. Perhaps this line of reasoning explains
why Drabovitch thought his age was in the midst of a “spiritual crisis,” which
he characterized in terms of blurred binaries: “the true and the false, the good
and the bad, the normal and the pathological become indistinct.”62
In lectures he delivered at the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris, the
scholar Max Hermant advanced an interpretation of Hitler’s Germany that
60 Drabovitch, Fragilité de la liberté, 147.
61 Pollès, L’Opéra politique, 193, 206, 216.
62 Drabovitch, Fragilité de la liberté, 160, 230-1.
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relied on collective psychological categories to argue that the Nazis used the
media to create Nazism as a “popular religion.” He suggested that Leni
Riefenstahl’s 1935 propaganda film Triumph of the Will (a depiction of the
September 1934 Nazi Congress and rally at Nuremberg) offered a “clear
vision” of the German collective “racial soul.” The notion of the German col-
lective racial soul — what Nazi philosopher Alfred Rosenberg called the
Rassenseele— had origins, according to Hermant, in thinkers such as Novalis,
Fichte, and Hegel, but, in Nazism, had left the “restricted arena of thinkers in
order to spread itself through the crowd,” thus becoming “properly speaking, a
religious notion.” Hitler, he argued, took power because he was able to perceive
and understand the “fundamental needs of the German soul” and then “incar-
nate” those needs in his person. This ability permitted him to make himself at
once “the apostle and Messiah” of the German people.63 Yet Hermant’s analy-
sis also figured the “religious” aspect of Nazism as an outcome of too much
rationality rather than as a sign of the absence of rationality. Germans, he
thought, made a religion out of technology; they worshipped the machine like
a god. Nazism’s “religion of activity is a vain attempt to dethrone the beautiful
and aestheticize the algebraic”64; it is “nothing more than a certain rationaliza-
tion of minds and hearts.”65 The antidote, he wrote, was a program of secular
humanism under-girded by the recognition of human limits. He advocated:
A sociology which is founded upon natural law and upon an exact knowledge
of our limits and capacities;...which observes that we are not masters of time
and that movement that accelerates without end is condemned to stop eventu-
ally; which refuses the dictatorship of the machine and the abdication of
thought in favor of rational calculus; and which, finally, reacts against the
abuse of power which resolves itself in powerlessness [puissance qui se résout
en impuissance].66
On this point Hermant’s logic strongly resembled Drabovitch’s. In this sym-
bolic universe, too much power paradoxically resolves itself in powerlessness;
the hyper-extension of at least a certain kind of rationality (opposed here to
“thought”) both reflects and produces irrational or “religious” impulses (the
religion of technology creates the religion of Nazism).
Most of the commentators examined here not only thought the individual
was vanishing in a thicket of mass culture and politics, they experienced the
waning of individuality as a serious cultural and spiritual crisis. This paper has
tried to account historically for the discursive production of that crisis, a crisis
63 Max Hermant, Hitlérisme et humanisme (Coulommiers and Paris: Impr. Paul Brodard et
Joseph Taupin, 1936), 15.
64 Max Hermant, Idoles Allemandes, 8th ed. (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1935), 348.
65 Hermant, Hitlérisme et humanisme, 28.
66 Hermant, Idoles Allemandes, 329.
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characterized by the paradox of secular-scientific phenomena such as the mod-
ern media seeming to displace “religious” impulses onto culture and politics
instead of mitigating or eliminating those impulses. I have attempted to trace
the construction of that paradox — from its beginnings in fin-de-siècle dis-
courses that shaped later conceptions of collective phenomena, to its interwar
development in various commentaries on the mass media and mass politics.
The blurring of the secular and scientific with the religious and occult played a
key role in fortifying the belief that the spiritual realm could no longer be con-
sidered necessarily transcendent, or other-worldly, or unknowable — indeed,
that it could perhaps lie at the very centre of the knowable, secular, material
world. At the same time, this fluid boundary between the secular and the reli-
gious was also attributable to the fact that new technologies began to do things
that were previously unimaginable except as supernatural phenomena (e.g., the
voice in Rome being audible in Paris).
Responses to this crisis varied, but one theme remained constant: the per-
sistent call to reinvigorate, restore, or resurrect the autonomous, rational,
implicitly male individual of liberal humanism as an antidote to collectivizing
forces such as fascism and communism. Bernanos argued, for example, that “it
is not Society which today is in the greatest peril, but rather Man, and assuredly
it has always been thus. But such a truth finds few to preach it, for the defense
of Society certainly pays better dividends than the defense of Man.”67 For his
part Hermant argued that a resurgence of universalistic liberal humanism was
necessary to combat fascist tendencies. Humanism, he suggested, should be
more than an ideal; it should carry the weight of a forceful and absolute “cer-
tainty” reinforced by passion.68
Issautier was most troubled by the fact that mental suggestions — his “spir-
itual waves” — were “creators of real physical phenomena as well as the
directors of social life.” “We find ourselves,” he argued, “unwittingly swept
toward the craziest of fantasies even as we believe that we live in the realm of
the real and the true.” In this way he implicitly positioned media representations
— the carriers of mental suggestions — between the material and the immater-
ial, between the real and the fantasmatic. But instead of formulating a
conception of cultural production that would take this ambiguity as constitutive
of culture and thus as a point of departure, Issautier anxiously insisted on the
fundamental separation of the real and the fantasmatic and called for the restora-
tion of the Cartesian subject. He warned that without that distinction and that
model of subjectivity, society would fall into skepticism and relativism, which
he accused of denying “purely and simply the reality of all phenomena.”69 His
67 Bernanos, Plea for Liberty.
68 Hermant, Hitlérisme et humanisme, 35-7.
69 Issautier, Grandes suggestions, 30.
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antidote to the “real and occult influence of suggestion and invisible waves” was
thus a strong Cartesian cry: “I think, therefore I am.”70
In addition to calling for a renewed individualism, most of the individuals
examined here expanded and transformed the meaning of religiosity. They
positioned it as immanent in the social and human world rather than immanent
and mystified in Nature, or alternatively, as transcendent in an other-world.
Widespread was the sense that the religious or spiritual could now be found
either literally or figuratively at the heart of the secular domains of mass cul-
ture and politics.
Some interesting theoretical issues arise when considering the fact that
commentators used the term “religious” both literally and figuratively in their
accounts of modern mass phenomena. As I have tried to argue, it was precisely
the definition of literal, true, or authentic religion that was in flux in the dis-
course I have tried to parse. If one thought, like LeBon, Bernheim, and many
of their followers, that religiosity could mean the collective expression of an
affective allegiance to a person or an idea regardless of whether the object of
devotion was supernatural or “this-worldly,” then mass phenomena could be
and were interpreted quite literally as new religions in secular form. But if one
thought, as a religious man such as Bernanos did, that true religion required a
more traditional belief in the reality and meaningfulness of a supernatural
realm, then fascism, communism, or the media-generated “star system,” could
be interpreted quite easily as inauthentic substitutes for the real thing. Religion,
for such commentators, was a convenient metaphor through which to describe
new mass phenomena. The point is that the slippage between the literal and the
figurative is precisely what was at issue in republican discourse on mass phe-
nomena and in the cultural crisis it provoked. It accounts for why a figure such
as Henri Pollès could present fascism as either a “type of religion or an imita-
tion of it,” without actually deciding between the two alternatives.
Something slightly different occurred when commentators wrote about the
formal similarities between new media, such as the radio, and religious or
occult phenomena. Here the evidence suggests much less slippage between lit-
eral and figurative usage: virtually no one argued that the telephone had a
literal connection to the supernatural or that it was generating ghostly pres-
ences with the help of anything other than modern physics. Comparisons with
the occult were simply used to convey the fascination with new technology. In
this context, science (as opposed to traditional religion) guaranteed the separa-
tion of the literal and the figurative, between real ghosts and their
technologically-generated modern analogues.
The conclusion to draw is that, ironically enough, what counted as literally
“religious” expanded at the very moment when secular republicans were trying
70 Ibid., 19, 30.
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to remove traditional religion from public life. Though the main story is one of
blurred boundaries between the religious and the secular, it is plausible, how-
ever, that the new fluidity given to the term “religion” was contained to some
degree — the stability of its more restricted conventional meaning bolstered —
in contexts where only traditional religions counted as religions or in contexts
where science enjoyed an exclusive right to describe the truth of reality.
The social theorist Jules Monnerot, we recall, asked the readers of Volontés
to consider two opposing possibilities: whether new spiritual leaders had
replaced the religious ones of the past, or whether society had reached a kind
of adulthood that permitted it to do without such leaders. But in framing his
inquiry in these terms, he, arguably, mischaracterized the dilemma facing his
contemporaries. If the evidence put forth here is any indication, interwar com-
mentators did not think they faced an either-or situation. Instead they struggled
to articulate their sense that the world had indeed reached a kind of adulthood
in its secularism, rationalism, and scientism, at the same time it had also — and
as an ominous consequence of that very adulthood — rekindled precisely the
religiosity they thought they had left behind. In other words, they experienced
and grappled with what philosophers Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer
later theorized, not without controversy, as the “Dialectic of Enlightenment,”
their name for that fearful process through which the limitless extension of
Enlightenment impulses produces precisely the undoing of Enlightenment.71
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